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Gregory R. Peterson
Can One Love the Distant Other?
Empathy, Affiliation, and Cosmopolitanism
An ongoing debate in political and moral philosophy concerns the nature of interna‑
tional obligations. While cosmopolitans argue that duties of justice are independent 
of national borders, statists argue otherwise, sometimes basing their account on the 
limitations of our empathic concern, a line of argument found much earlier in Adam 
Smith. Although critics argue that empathy is neither necessary nor sufficient for 
morality, and although statists imply that psychological limitations of the kind that 
would be based in empathy prevent the realization of commitments to distant others 
beyond humanitarian aid, I argue that both these views are incorrect. While the pos‑
session of cognitive and emotional empathy is clearly not sufficient for being moral, 
the requirement for cognitive empathy arises out of a proper understanding of moral 
functioning, and the need for emotional empathy arises out of a natural necessity 
due to the kind of affiliative, biological creatures that we are. Since our capacities for 
cognitive and emotional empathy are not simply innately given but capable of being 
shaped by processes of learning and culture, statist arguments against stronger 
moral obligations across nations are poorly founded.
Let us suppose that the great empire of China, with all its myriads of inhabitants, was 
suddenly swallowed up by an earthquake, and let us consider how a man of humanity 
in Europe, who had no sort of connection with that part of the world, would be affected 
upon receiving intelligence of this dreadful calamity. He would, I imagine, first of all 
express very strongly his sorrow for the misfortune of that unhappy people. … And when 
all this fine philosophy was over, when all these humane sentiments had been once fairly 
expressed, he would pursue his business or his pleasure, take his repose or his diversion, 
with the same ease and tranquility as if no such accident had happened. The most frivo-
lous disaster which could befall himself would occasion a more real disturbance.
Adam Smith ([1759] 2009, 161)
1. Introduction
In this famous passage, Adam Smith sums up the problem faced by advo-
cates of global justice. While individuals may feel strong obligations to those 
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Can One Love the Distant Other? 5
physically near, this feeling often falls dramatically in relation to distance 
and social connection. Smith’s words still ring true today, even though the 
ability of Americans, Europeans, and Chinese to affect one another is much 
greater than in the 18th century. True, large natural disasters can spur enor-
mous outpourings of humanitarian relief, but these are driven by dramatic 
television images of human suffering that transform the distant into the 
near. By contrast, the grinding poverty experienced by some 800 million 
individuals globally attracts far less attention, and more complicated forms 
of injustice and oppression receive just as little or even less attention.
It is easy to interpret Smith as implying that our emotional dispositions 
are largely fixed, even though he gave some room for being able to con-
trol them and so enabling a concept of virtue. We find this natural fixity 
affirmed by David Hume, who regarded our moral sentiments as a ‘brute 
fact’ to be subject to analysis ([1777] 1975). If we interpret Smith’s analy-
sis of the limits of empathy as such a brute fact, the implications for our 
understanding of international obligations are stark, for even if moral 
theory informs us that the moral rights of Chinese citizens are identical 
to those of English men and women, if we are unable to conceive of what 
it is like to suffer through an earthquake in China, we are unlikely to do 
anything about it. International relations would then reduce to a state of 
nature as social contract theorists such as Thomas Hobbes and John Locke 
argued. The goal of this paper is to argue otherwise. While Smith is correct 
that throughout most of history to the present day our circle of concern 
has been limited and that this limiting is associated with a corresponding 
limiting of willingness to engage empathetically with distant others, this is 
not a necessary feature of being human. Cultures vary in morally relevant 
behaviors, and it is plausible to suppose that our willingness to engage oth-
ers empathetically varies as well.
Part 1 of the paper provides groundwork laying out one plausible account 
of moral functioning and the role that empathy plays in it. Part 2 applies 
this account to contemporary debates between cosmopolitans and stat-
ists. While this debate does not wholly hinge on claims about the limits 
of empathy, one rationale put forward in favor of statism is the claim that 
our affiliative bonds are necessarily limited to co-nationals in a way that 
prevents more cosmopolitan oriented concepts of moral obligation from 
becoming a reality. But if our empathizing is not so limited, the credence 
of this argument is reduced.
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2. Empathy and the Morally Mature Agent-Reasoner (MMAR)
a) The MMAR, Flourishing, and the State
The relation of morality and empathy is not as clear as it often first seems, 
and the importance of empathy to morality depends on the theory in ques-
tion. My interest here is to apply the question to what I take to be at least 
one plausible account of morality, rooted in an Aristotelian or eudaimonis-
tic framework and based significantly on the concept of a ‘mature moral 
agent-reasoner’ (MMAR). Being morally mature requires both the capacity 
for well-developed moral reasoning and the capacity to act as an agent. An 
agent who reasons about moral matters but who behaves abominably is not 
morally mature. Whether the converse holds is less clear, but moral matu-
rity entails the desirability of not only acting well but also thinking well: An 
agent who is genuinely morally mature engages both.
If we start with the basic question, ‘why be good?,’ a standard line of argu-
ment from Immanuel Kant grounds the answer in an abstract conception 
of reason: We are to be good because acting in a morally bad way is irra-
tional (Kant [1785] 1998). If one holds a divine command theory, the good 
is defined solely in terms of divine will, and we desire to do good motivated 
out of a fear of punishment, a love of God, or both.
On both accounts, the good and the reason to do the good is defined 
independently of human nature. An Aristotelian-eudaimonistic account 
differs in this regard, for even if the good is not defined solely in terms of 
human nature, the claim is made that the pursuit of the good is, in some 
deep sense, a fulfillment of human nature properly understood. Aristote-
lian-eudaimonists are thus committed to a concept of objective flourish-
ing. Flourishing is not identical to either happiness or pleasure, and in the 
Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle himself was careful to distinguish eudaimonia 
from pleasure as conceived in his day. But this is not to say that the two are 
unrelated. Normally a flourishing life will include both conventional happi-
ness and pleasure in proper amounts, and a life totally devoid of these could 
hardly be counted as flourishing. Since our ability to experience happiness 
and pleasure is dependent on external circumstances, our ability to flourish 
is not entirely up to us, and external circumstances can help or hinder our 
capacity to flourish.
A criticism is sometimes made that a eudaimonistic account of ethics is 
ultimately egoistic in character. If I am focused on my own flourishing, I 
would pursue relationships with others only to the extent that they are ben-
eficial to me, and so my aims are correspondingly prudential rather than 
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Can One Love the Distant Other? 7
moral; to invert Kant, others are treated as means rather than ends (this line 
of argument is pursued for instance by Wolterstorff 2008; Scanlon 1998). 
I reject this argument. Someone may of course start out focused solely on 
their own happiness, but typically they will find themselves unhappy, finally 
realizing that a better life is one that is not solely self-focused. Paradoxically, 
the good of eudaimonia on the individual level can be achieved only by not 
solely aiming at it.
The good of affiliation provides a means of understanding this. By affili-
ation I mean simply the kind of bonds that form in families and friend-
ships, relationships that are thick and meaningful to those in them. One is 
pressed to find clear references to affiliation in the most influential writings 
of Kant and J. S. Mill, yet Aristotle devotes a whole book of the Nicoma-
chean Ethics to friendship. Aristotle is correct in this emphasis: Humans are 
indeed social, and not merely social in the way that wildebeests are. Humans 
form personal attachments and complex narrative relationships; if we are 
deprived of such relationships, we suffer considerably1. Affiliation is thus 
not accidental to the good life, it is integral to it.
While affiliation is a necessary component of a good life, it is not suf-
ficient, and not all forms of affiliation deserve moral approbation. There 
are healthy and unhealthy forms of affiliation, and we may limit our affili-
ative responses to others almost at whim. Something more is needed, and 
one route focuses on the way that the good of affiliation provides a solu-
tion. The first step is to focus on character traits important for strong and 
healthy relationships even within a small group. I would need to be able to 
respond effectively and appropriately to the others in my group, and this 
would imply a developed set of social skills to be able to do so. Among these 
would be appropriately developed sympathetic and empathetic responses. A 
flourishing relationship requires both a properly developed capacity to feel 
for someone else, as well as the capacity to think about the state of mind of 
others and even to feel with them2.
This leads to the second step, which involves consideration of how to 
conceive of the mature moral agent-reasoner. Remember that we are treat-
ing affiliation as an independent moral good, one that in an ideal case is to 
1 A point now well substantiated in the psychological literature on loneliness. See 
Cacioppo and Patrick 2008.
2 I will discuss empathy in more detail shortly, but I use ‘sympathy’ in a way familiar in 
the literature: A sympathetic response involves feeling for the plight of another, but it 
does not involve having the same emotion as the other. I may feel pity for a friend who 
has lost her job, but I do not necessarily feel the same emotion as she. I feel pity, while 
she may feel depressed, despondent, or angry.
Gregory R. Peterson8
be achieved maximally. If one treats one’s affiliates badly, one hurts not only 
the others but oneself as well, because one foregoes the kind of relation-
ship one could have had if one had treated one’s affiliates well. This in turn 
requires the development of those skills and virtues that enable one to do 
this. But once one has done this, once one has become an MMAR, two kinds 
of scope problems emerge. First, an MMAR will naturally begin to consider 
the well-being of those outside of one’s own group partly because of those 
skills developed to interact well with one’s affiliates. Once one fully develops 
the awareness to be able to consider the suffering of another as an other, it 
makes possible the application of this awareness to all others, not just one’s 
affiliates. Further, we might expect an MMAR to develop these responses 
automatically with respect to affiliates; but once rendered automatic with 
respect to affiliates, it becomes prone to be activated by others as well.
But there is a second scope issue: Although it is possible to live a life with-
out making new affiliations, it is plausible to think that the MMAR will not 
go this route. Rather, the MMAR will actively pursue new affiliative relation-
ships, since a life with more and different affiliates is richer than one with 
fewer. I can live my entire life within the confines of a single village, but in 
most cases this will be a much diminished life in comparison to the one that 
engages those across the river. Further, since the MMAR will have developed 
skills of moral reasoning, the MMAR will reflect on the world not only as 
it is, but as it ought to be. A world absent of conflict but full of opportuni-
ties for new kinds of affiliation is better than one full of conflict with the 
attendant destruction of affiliative relationships and possibilities that follow.
This account of the MMAR in turn has implications for how we conceive 
of state obligations. On a liberal account of the state, the function of the 
state is to provide an arena and boundary conditions that allows citizens to 
pursue their own understanding of flourishing, or ‘projects’ as Rawls puts it 
(1971). Liberalism is sometimes understood to be in principle neutral with 
respect to conceptions of flourishing, but this account is problematic pre-
cisely because some projects, those that challenge the very presuppositions 
of liberalism, are excluded. MMARs, concerned as they are with the flour-
ishing of self and other, will endorse at least a liberal conception of the state 
precisely because it protects basic components of flourishing. Traditionally, 
such protections have been grounded in terms of rights, and a rich literature 
exists on basic rights, including subsistence rights, that states are obligated to 
protect (see, e. g., Shue 1996; Pogge 2002; Hassoun 2012). Grounding rights 
adequately is sometimes seen to be problematic, but on the account being 
developed here it is natural to conceive of them emerging out of the capabili-
ties that are necessary constituents of human flourishing. This is essentially 
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Can One Love the Distant Other? 9
the approach promoted by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum, and Nuss-
baum in particular has made some effort to connect the language of capabili-
ties to that of rights and liberalism (Sen 1999, 2009; Nussbaum 2007, 2011).
The MMAR on this model has a strong sense of moral obligation to fellow 
citizens within the state, but that sense of obligation is not limited to co-cit-
izens. For the MMAR, a world connected and at peace, mutually entangled 
in rich affiliative networks, is better than one that isn’t. It follows that the 
MMAR will follow some version of cosmopolitanism on the international 
scene; the only reason to resist such a move would be if it turned out that 
there was some limitation of human nature that foreclosed possibilities for 
considerations of justice and well-being to be supported across nations and 
not just within them.
b) Empathy and the MMAR
The preceding is but a sketch to indicate how one might move from consid-
erations of individual well-being and flourishing to that of the community, 
state, and world. Once one starts to conceive of MMARs, it is difficult to 
see how empathy could not be a crucial component of the capacity to be an 
MMAR at all, since a mature moral agent and reasoner must act with deep 
concern for the others he or she is in contact with. But this raises a number 
of questions, not least that of the best and proper account of what empathy 
is. For the past two decades empathy has been the subject of intense and 
ongoing research in psychology and related fields, and partly as a result there 
is greater need for being clear what we mean by the term. C. Daniel Batson 
(2009) has listed up to eight different meanings of ‘empathy’ used in the 
empirical literature, while Decety and Cowell (2014) distinguish between 
emotional, motivational, and cognitive empathy.
For the present purpose, I will utilize the distinction between cognitive 
and emotional empathy employed by Decety and Cowell and which is found 
elsewhere in the literature (e. g., Shamay-Tsoory 2011). By emotional empa-
thy I mean the capacity to feel the same emotions or sensations as another. 
This includes but is not identical to emotional contagion, since the paradigm 
cases of emotional contagion involve automatic processes involving mimicry 
that give rise to the emotion. Emotional contagion is important, but not all 
emotional empathy is emotional contagion.
Cognitive empathy involves the capacity for theory of mind/mindreading. 
This can be understood in terms of the ability to put oneself in the shoes of 
another or to more directly imagine what it would like to be another per-
son in a given situation. Batson differentiates these two capacities, as does 
Gregory R. Peterson10
Peter Goldie (2011), but I class both abilities as cases of cognitive empathy 
because such efforts do not necessarily involve a strong emotional compo-
nent. Indeed, in a given situation, the emphasis may be on what another 
person is thinking rather than feeling. But cognitive and emotional empa-
thy can be combined, and one may be consciously trying to figure out how 
someone will feel in a situation and as a result produce that feeling within 
oneself. If my friend is going skydiving, I may choose to imagine her expe-
rience while she is doing it, prompting feelings of fear, vertigo, and excite-
ment in the process3.
A second important question concerns the relation of empathy to dual-
process models of mental activity. On the dual process account, our cog-
nitions and feelings are divided between the implicit (unconscious and 
automatic) and explicit (consciously accessible and at least sometimes con-
trolled), and a large body of literature has developed concerning the ways 
that implicit processing may influence behavior even though the subject 
is not aware of the implicit motives at work (Bargh 1997). The basic ver-
sion of this model and the research that underlies it is problematic, since 
among other considerations it fails to take into account both long term and 
short term longitudinal effects. It is more plausible that such processing be 
described as interactive, since past explicit efforts may result in the devel-
opment of implicit traits and biases. Learning to play piano is a paradigm 
case. That being said, clearly at any given moment both implicit and explicit 
processing may be occurring, and such processes may work in tandem or in 
opposition4. We can conceive of empathic processing as having both implicit 
and explicit forms. In the case of cognitive empathy, there is now much evi-
dence for implicit empathic processing associated with mirror neurons or 
‘shared circuits’ in the brain, now found in several areas and associated with 
a range of activities (Pineda 2010). Implicit emotional empathic processing 
is perhaps a bit harder to conceive, but we are sometimes, perhaps often, 
not aware of the source of our emotions, and these may give rise to forms of 
bodily arousal of which the subject is at best dimly aware.
So, empathy may be emotional or cognitive, and it may be implicit or 
explicit. A third question is this: To what extent should we consider the 
3 While it is plausible to think that all cognitions are emotionally valenced, I think the 
distinction between cognitive and emotional is useful, since strong emotions in particu-
lar have motivational power in a way that merely thinking about something does not.
4 A simple example of such ‘in tandem’ processing would be the play of chess experts. 
As is well documented, much of the knowledge that chess experts rely on is implicit in 
character, developed over thousands of hours of practice, but this implicit knowledge 
is employed in conjunction with explicit considerations and goals, not least that of win-
ning the game (Gobet, Retschitzki, and de Voogt 2004).
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Can One Love the Distant Other? 11
capacity to empathize to be something that we are born with? The capacity 
for empathy is widely held, and nearly all of us automatically and without 
reflection employ empathic processing daily. Indeed, the inability to think 
and feel empathetically results in major social difficulties. Autism spectrum 
and Asperger individuals are particularly well-known for being deficient in 
their ability to engage in cognitive empathy in particular, but their condi-
tion is inclusive of emotional empathy as well. Psychopaths are also widely 
believed to be empathetically deficient, although the story here so far is 
complicated. Psychopaths suffer from lower emotional response generally, 
and evidence suggests that they are not completely devoid of the capacity 
for cognitive empathy as they are able and inclined to employ it at will (Blair 
and Blair 2009; Keysers 2011).
It is thus plausible to think that the capacity for cognitive and emotional 
empathy is something that we are born with in a nontrivial sense. They are 
capacities that nearly everyone has, and those that have significantly altered 
or diminished capacity for empathy are individuals whom we now class as 
suffering from a cognitive disability. Infants begin imitating facial expres-
sions within days of birth, and babies at 12 months can imitate goal-directed 
actions (Schwier et al. 2006). The ability to detect false beliefs in another, 
widely considered an important marker for mindreading and thus cognitive 
empathy, typically appears in 3–4 year olds. Indirect evidence of emotional 
empathy can be found in the spontaneous other concern and comfort giv-
ing of children as early as age two (Davidov et al. 2013). Such developmental 
studies provide limited evidence for claims about the innateness of traits like 
empathy, but they are enough to indicate that empathy occurs as part of the 
normal maturational pattern of human beings5.
If empathy is at least to some degree an innate and natural capacity, to 
what extent can it be learned? One might be inclined to say that if the trait 
is innate then no learning is necessary, but in the case of empathy this claim 
is problematic because individuals differ in their patterns of empathic cog-
nition and emotion. The question of the extent to which empathy can be 
learned is also highly relevant to certain kinds of ethical issues, not least of 
those being whether we should regard empathy as a virtue. Aristotle argued 
that virtues are not something we are born with since, to be an element of 
5 A full story would include evidence from genetics, and future discoveries will likely 
prove revealing. But complex social traits are unlikely candidates for simple genetic 
explanations and undoubtedly involve a number of genes that serve not only our capac-
ity for empathy but other functions as well. So we may call empathy a natural trait of 
being human, where ‘natural’ implies relative fixity of a trait due to genetic/develop-
mental constraints within the range of biologically normal environments.
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character, virtues have to be developed (Nicomachean Ethics, book 2, chap-
ter 1). On Aristotle’s account it follows that if our capacity for empathy is 
fixed biologically, then empathy is not a virtue (this line of argument is 
taken, e. g., by Battaly 2011).
I will take up the issue of empathy and learning again in section two, but 
it is important to point out two indicators that, while we may be said to be 
in some sense empathic by nature, we nevertheless learn to apply empathy in 
different ways. One study provides evidence that empathy can be learned by 
showing that the circle of empathic response of children is limited to familiar 
individuals, especially their mother (Davidov et al. 2013). From three to nine 
years, children start to modulate empathy according to social categories, 
and evidence indicates that they can be shaped by implicit attitudes, group 
preferences, and social status (Rhodes and Chalik 2013; Hogeveen, Inzlicht, 
and Obhi 2014). Adults vary considerably on self-report empathy scales, and 
such empathic connections, emotional or cognitive, are not limited to our 
species. Although women are commonly thought to be more empathetic 
than men, studies suggest that this, too, is culturally modulated (Ickes 2009). 
Preliminary recent work also suggests that the reading of literature can influ-
ence positively our capacity for empathy (Kidd and Castano 2013).
With these factors in mind, we assess the relevance of empathy for 
MMARs. Is empathy, or the right kind of empathy, important for becom-
ing a mature moral agent and reasoner? The answer might seem to be obvi-
ously yes, but we should be careful. Having the capacity for cognitive and 
emotional empathy, whether held together or separately, is not sufficient for 
being an MMAR or even a moral agent at all. Since most humans possess 
some degree of cognitive and emotional empathy, and since most humans 
are not MMARs, it follows that the capacity for empathy is not sufficient 
for being moral. Further, while the perspective-taking capacity of cognitive 
empathy can be used for good purposes, it can also be used for distinctively 
evil ones; a torturer is all the more effective if he can imagine what proce-
dures will be maximally painful6. Similar problems emerge with emotional 
empathy, since my emotions may improperly lead me to give preferential 
treatment to some, and I may lack proper emotional responses when per-
ceiving the plight of others different from me7.
6 A point made by Nussbaum (2001), among others. Whether emotional empathy can 
be used in the same way is less likely: It is hard to imagine torture ever occurring if the 
torturer experienced the same sensations and emotions as the tortured subject.
7 Xu, Wang, and Han (2009) provide neuroscientific evidence for this, demonstrating 
that the anterior cingulate cortex activates differentially for racial ingroup and outgroup 
members. See Miller 2013, 127 for discussion.
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Can One Love the Distant Other? 13
So, possession of neither cognitive nor emotional empathy is sufficient 
for being moral. Are they necessary? In the case of cognitive empathy, it is 
hard to conceive of how one could function well morally without the capac-
ity for perspective-taking that cognitive empathy entails. To understand how 
to behave correctly with respect to you as an individual requires a sensitive 
understanding of how you will react to what I say and do. Many standard 
moral dilemmas often treat people as abstractions, but much of our life 
involves interactions with people whom we know at a deep level, with the 
result that we understand which words motivate and lift up and which words 
destroy. But all of this requires perspective-taking, both implicit and explicit, 
and for many of us, much of our day is taken up with thinking about what 
other people are thinking and doing and how they will react to our think-
ings and doings. It is precisely for this reason that people with diminished 
capacity for perspective-taking, such as those with Asperger’s Syndrome, 
find the social world so bewildering. This is not to say that such individuals 
cannot act morally at all, but rather that their ability to do so is diminished.
These considerations imply that cognitive empathy is a necessary feature 
of morality, since one cannot form proper moral motives without engaging 
in perspective-taking. What of emotional empathy? This argument is more 
difficult, since it might seem that I can still have the proper motives and 
perform the morally correct actions without having to feel the same things 
others feel. The fact that I lack empathy does not imply that I lack emotional 
responses, only that my emotional responses do not match others. When I 
engage in perspective-taking, it seems possible for me to imagine that some-
one will get angry without feeling anger myself, and I can feel sympathy for 
someone injured in a car accident without feeling pain with the suffering 
individual.
While this seems possible, there are difficulties, and I propose two argu-
ments for the necessity of emotional empathy for the moral life. The first 
argument involves the idea of natural necessity: While in theory an organ-
ism can function as a moral agent and lack emotional empathy, in practice 
this is an extraordinarily difficult thing to do. Normal human cognition is 
integrated with emotional processing, and when areas of the brain that inte-
grate cognitive and emotional dimensions of decision-making are damaged, 
impaired judgment, including impaired moral judgment, follows (Anderson 
et al. 1999; Young et al. 2010). If individuals were separately impaired for 
emotional empathy, I suspect we would find a corresponding difficulty in 
making moral judgments. Because our emotions are prompted by implicit 
cognitive processes, they are ‘snap judgments’ about a situation, prompting 
immediate reaction. Without that capacity for snap judgment, including a 
Gregory R. Peterson14
snap judgment about the emotion of another that involves the phenomenon 
of ‘feeling with,’ our processing takes more time and is more prone to error8.
This first argument includes conjectural elements, and would depend on 
how empirical evidence plays out. But a second argument, while more gen-
eral, is stronger, and goes like this: A central feature of a good life, of a life 
worth living, is affiliation, the capacity to form deep and lasting relation-
ships. But to have deep and lasting relationships requires the capacity for 
emotional empathy, to feel with one’s loved ones. Imagine a world where 
spouses, parents and friends did not engage in emotional empathy, where 
the parent could not feel joy with the child at her graduation, could only 
complement the child or, at best, feel joy at the same time, but only joy for 
oneself 9. Such a world is qualitatively poorer; recognizing the good of affilia-
tion entails recognizing the significance of emotional empathy for that good.
Nevertheless, some important recent objections have been made regard-
ing empathy and morality. In a widely read article, Paul Bloom (2013) makes 
a twofold argument against an empathy based morality. First, he argues that 
empathy can often lead us astray, citing the example of ‘baby Jessica.’ In 1987, 
18 month old Jessica McClure fell down a narrow well, and the more than 
two days it took to free her prompted a media frenzy and a flood of dona-
tions. While individual tragedies and those that are highly visual attract a 
great deal of attention, other tragedies that are just as – if not more – sig-
nificant, such as the crisis in Darfur that began in 2003, get less attention. 
These anecdotes on the problematic partiality of empathy are supported 
by empirical research, and Bloom cites an experiment by Kogut and Ritov 
(2005) showing that subjects presented information on an individual child 
in most cases donate more than when shown information about a group of 
eight children. Secondly, he argues that individuals with Asperger’s Syn-
drome are able to function with a moral code even though they are deficient 
in empathic processing. So, according to Bloom, the fact that empathy is 
prone to partiality shows that empathy is not sufficient for morality, and the 
8 Evolutionary considerations might support this. Why, after all, do we have the capacity 
for emotional empathy? Possibly emotional empathy is an adaptive sort of self-decep-
tion, but if emotional empathy has a function, it is plausible to think it is because it 
enables us to make better decisions, not worse ones.
9 Here, the distinction between fuller emotional empathy and emotional contagion is 
crucial; one might inadvertently feel happy at a graduation but not know why one is 
happy. It is crucial to the good of affiliation that one feels the joy of the graduate, not 
simply generic joy or one’s own joy. Empirical evidence for spousal emotional empa-
thy is provided by Singer et al. (2004), who use fMRI to show that part of the pain 
matrix of a spouse’s brain activates when witnessing the other spouse receive a painful 
stimulus.
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fact that Asberger’s individuals can behave morally shows that it is not nec-
essary. Jesse Prinz (2011) supports these arguments but also adds another: 
When it comes to moral motivation, he argues that empirical literature indi-
cates that other emotions such as guilt and anger are stronger motivators for 
moral behavior, while empathy is relatively weak.
A basic problem with the arguments that Bloom and Prinz make is that 
they do not clearly distinguish between cognitive and emotional empathy, 
and this produces considerable ambiguity. Certainly, they are correct that 
empathy is not sufficient for moral behavior, and they are correct that empa-
thy, perhaps especially emotional empathy, can lead us morally astray. But 
it is difficult to see how the capacity for cognitive empathy is not a requisite 
for effective moral decision-making and it is difficult to see how emotional 
empathy is not in practical terms necessary in a broader sense. Much hinges 
on their argument that individuals with Asberger’s both lack empathy and 
have something like a fully functioning morality. But we should at best 
proceed cautiously here. Surely Asberger’s individuals can and do func-
tion in society and are capable of following explicit moral norms. But their 
impairment is also relevant, affecting their capacity for moral judgment in 
important respects. In one study, individuals with high functioning autism 
were unable to clearly distinguish between accidental and intended harms 
(Moran et al. 2011). Similarly, we should be cautious about Prinz’s argument 
that empathy is a weak motivator. Cognitive empathy likely plays some role 
in motivation, since it is crucial to perceiving moral situations correctly, but 
cognitive empathy is just as if not more important for determining which 
actions are appropriate once a moral situation is perceived. In the case of 
cognitive empathy, then, motivation is at best half the story. If we under-
stand Prinz to be speaking of emotional empathy, his argument is potentially 
inconsistent, since he argues that (a) empathy is a strong motivator for bad 
moral behavior as well as (b) not a strong motive for good behavior. This is 
of course logically possible, but we should be suspicious. The experiments 
cited do not reveal how emotional empathy is bad in toto but rather how 
emotional empathy can go astray, especially in situations that occur at the 
borders of empathic concern. This is a real issue, but only serves to show 
why empathy is not sufficient for moral functioning, not why it is not nec-
essary.
To summarize: I have so far argued for a eudaimonistic account of ethics 
that incorporates an understanding of the good of affiliation and the con-
cept of an MMAR. These provide grounding for understanding the nature of 
our moral obligations, with implications for understanding political obliga-
tions as well. Further, I argued that both cognitive and emotional empathy 
Gregory R. Peterson16
are integral to mature moral functioning. The question now arises: What 
role can and should empathy play in current debates about obligations to 
distant others?
3. Populations, Institutions, and MMARs
When we turn to matters of obligations and the state, we find ourselves 
faced with two kinds of problems. One concerns understanding how and to 
what extent we commit morally to compatriots, our fellow-citizens within 
the borders of the state. The second concerns our ability to commit across 
state borders. To most observers, the first problem, while significant, is a 
lesser one, and while philosophers may ponder the justification for commit-
ments to the state and compatriots – social contract theories being a domi-
nant approach – empirically it is clear that many peoples have little problem 
embracing such commitments. More troublesome are the obligations across 
nations. For contract theorists like Hobbes and Locke, the relation between 
nations just is the state of nature, revealing the claim that the concept is not 
a mere abstraction.
Peter Singer’s (1972) essay on famine opened the contemporary philo-
sophical debate on international moral obligations. In political philosophy, 
debate has centered on contrasting views of ‘statism’ versus ‘cosmopolitan-
ism.’ For statists, we only have duties of humanitarian concern to those out-
side our borders. As a result, justice, especially distributive justice, can only 
occur within state borders. For John Rawls, this is based on the different 
kind of social contract arrangements that ought to apply within a people 
and across peoples. For Thomas Nagel, it is because the requirements of 
justice emerge as a result of our mutual coercion enforced on one another 
through the state (Rawls 1971, 1999; Nagel 2005). Cosmopolitans reject this, 
and while cosmopolitans are diverse, they are held together by the convic-
tion that moral and political obligations across nations involve more than 
national self-interest and the occasional act of humanitarian aid. For the 
cosmopolitan, justice applies across nations, often based either on a concept 
of universal rights or on a modification of Rawls’ social contract approach 
(Shue 1996; Pogge 2002; Brock 2009).
In section 1a), I argued that an MMAR would in fact believe that we have 
duties and obligations not just to compatriots but also to non-compatriots, 
and that this realization arises out of (a)  the development of critical and 
emotional capacities, including sympathy and empathy, that apply not only 
to affiliates but also to non-affiliates, and (b)  the positive valuing of new 
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and more extensive affiliative networks. Given this, the limit of obligations 
by the statist to those of extreme humanitarian concern seems implausible 
to the MMAR. Given the commitments of an MMAR, a better world is one 
where not only oneself but others flourish as well, including distant others. 
A world where some live in abundance beyond measure and others eke by 
is a world that has not yet met its potential, and it is incumbent upon those 
living in abundance to use it well.
How this is to be done leaves out a great many details, including ques-
tions of how to balance obligations to affiliates, compatriots, and non-com-
patriot non-affiliates. Here, I wish to focus on a challenge that may arise 
due to perceived limits of empathic abilities. Statists sometimes imply that 
human beings simply have a natural limit to their capacity for empathy, and 
because of this it is unrealistic to expect people to have genuine concern 
for non-compatriots. This is what Adam Smith was arguing in the passage 
cited at the beginning of this article. It is just a fact of human nature that our 
willingness to act arises out of emotional responses, and if we are incapable 
of feeling strong emotions concerning the plights of distant others, we are 
incapable of acting even if we ought to.
Rawls (1999) himself makes an argument along this line:
It is the task of the statesman to struggle against the potential lack of affinity among 
different peoples and try to heal its causes insofar as they derive from past domestic 
injustices. … Since the affinity among peoples is naturally weaker (as a matter of human 
psychology) as society-wide institutions include a larger area and cultural distances 
i crease, the statesman must continually combat these shortsighted tendencies (112).
Since Rawls is arguing only for humanitarian aid, the implication seems to 
be that the statesman [sic!] has the difficult task of motivating citizens to 
get to even that point, let alone stronger forms of international concern. As 
this passage indicates, a crucial factor for Rawls is what he envisions as the 
natural weakness of “affinity among peoples,” for which empathy ought to 
play a key role.
We find a similar line of argument by David Miller. Like Rawls, Miller 
does not mention empathy specifically, but in On Nationality (1997) he 
argues on behalf of nationalism and ethical particularism based on our abili-
ties and inabilities to form affiliative ties. Nationality for Miller emerges out 
of a sense of identity that is sourced in mutual obligations, relations, and 
shared history. Such identity is presumably underwritten by our capacity for 
empathy, in this case perhaps especially emotional empathy. Miller further 
grounds this as a natural capacity and limitation by appealing to Hume in a 
crucial footnote (1997, 58).
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As presented so far, these arguments are quite loose, and neither Rawls 
nor Miller develop their foundations at length. Further, it is easy to imagine 
that there exists a stronger and weaker version of each argument. The weaker 
version would claim that all people are by nature limited in their empathic 
capacities in the way that Smith outlined, and it is because of this that no 
obligations stronger than humanitiarian assistance can be required. But the 
premise of this argument is obviously false, since individuals exist who are so 
motivated and devote considerable time, effort, and money to that end. The 
stronger version of the argument would thus acknowledge that such indi-
viduals exist, but then argue further that such individuals are only a small 
fraction of any population. More precisely, such individuals are necessarily a 
small fraction of the population. But why think this?
Here the literature on cooperation and empathy has potential signifi-
cance, and the statist can appeal to the kind of empirical research cited by 
Bloom and Prinz. A study by Mitchell, Macrae, and Banaji (2006) indicates 
that individuals reflecting on the decisions of others engage brain areas 
associated with simulation/empathy only when the other is perceived to 
be like them. An experiment by de Dreu et al. (2011) indicates that height-
ened levels of oxytocin increase in-group affiliation and out-group hostil-
ity. And there are theoretical reasons to think that our capacity for empathy 
and affiliation may have limits. On a group selectionist account, it is argued 
that we would expect the development of strong affiliation with in-group 
members, including the ability to emotionally empathize with them, but 
group selection does not support such out-group identification, and may 
even militate against it (Sober and Wilson 1998). More empirical work is 
needed, but we see the plausible line of argument that the statist can make 
supporting Smith and Hume: We are by nature limited in our capacity for 
both cognitive and emotional empathy, and so we should not expect indi-
viduals to identify strongly enough with distant others to promote anything 
more than humanitarian aid.
How might the cosmopolitan respond to this? Recall the argument in 
section 1a) that empathy is not simply innate but also learned. The statist 
might reply that even if this is so, there is a limit, and that limit lies at the 
boundary of our affiliative and national commitments. But we should now 
be suspicious of this claim. To begin with, there is a prima facie problem with 
inferring claims about human nature from the kind of empirical research 
cited, since the fact that a behavior is widespread does not by itself make it 
biologically innate: That we all believe that the sun rises in the east does not 
by itself imply that we are genetically predetermined to do so. While stud-
ies of children lend plausibility to the innateness scenario, it is still difficult 
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to disentangle the respective roles of culture and biology. Further, there is 
ample evidence that (a)  people vary considerably on self-report scales of 
empathy (Keysers 2011) and (b) that culture plays a significant role in how 
and to what extent individuals are willing to play by moral rules and coop-
erate. In the case of the latter, I cite but two examples. In a series of well-
known cross cultural studies, Joseph Henrich et al. (2000, 2006, 2010) found 
considerable cultural variability in subject’s altruism, willingness to punish, 
and willingness to accept unfair offers in the ultimatum game. Similarly, a 
study by Benedikt Herrmann and colleagues (2008) shows significant cul-
tural variability was also found among different European nationals playing 
a public goods game when subjects were given the opportunity to punish 
‘cheaters’ and when given the opportunity to punish the punishers (labeled 
as ‘anti-social punishment’).
The researches of Henrich and Herrmann do not test for empathy in 
either of its forms, but they give us a hint of what direction empirical empa-
thy research might go. On the statist account, we should not expect pop-
ulations to support more than humanitarian assistance because of natu-
ral limits of our ability to empathize with others. As the work by Henrich 
demonstrates, our conceptions of fairness and our willingness to support a 
conception of the common good are culturally variable10. But since morally 
based cooperation requires the presence of both properly trained cognitive 
and emotional empathy, we should expect that these abilities can not only be 
learned, but that they can be learned by many. This is not to say that such a 
learning process is easy or automatic, and the literature that the statist is able 
to cite is a reminder of this. But what it does indicate is that moral learning is 
not simply an individual process but a cultural one, requiring the building of 
communities that form networks of support to rising generations.
In Political Emotions, Martha Nussbaum (2013) develops a number of 
proposals for developing such networks of citizenry. Some of her proposals 
are plausible. Following Kant, Nussbaum recognizes the human capacity for 
radical evil, and sees this capacity as something that is a nearly inevitable 
aspect of development to be addressed. Those emotions which are politi-
cally problematic, such as disgust when applied socially, need to be tamped 
down in development, while other emotions need proper nourishment and 
cultivation. Contrary to some cosmopolitans, Nussbaum sees patriotism in 
the sense of love of country as having a valuable role if cultivated properly. 
10 But, I should add, not absolutely so. For instance, in Henrich’s cross-cultural study of 
individuals playing the ultimatum game, which involves an offer by one player to split 
money and a decision by the second player to accept the offer or refuse it with the result 
that neither player receives any money, no population accepted worse than a 75/25 split.
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Nussbaum also gives a prominent place to liberal arts education, especially 
to the role of literature and theater in developing better and appropriate 
skills of empathy.
Although not all of Nussbaum’s proposals are equally promising, I high-
light them as paths that are worthwhile to pursue and which also are deserv-
ing of more empirical research11. We have at this point a strong sense of our 
capacity for cognitive and emotional empathy and some of the ways in which 
our capacity for empathy can be misapplied. But we have much less sense of 
why and how differences in levels of empathy occur, let alone how proper 
skills of empathy, to empathize in the right way, in the right amount, at the 
right time, are best developed. These are yet important paths to explore.
4. Conclusion
Although critics argue that empathy is neither necessary nor sufficient for 
morality, and although statists imply that psychological limitations of the 
kind that would be based in empathy prevent the realization of commit-
ments to distant others beyond humanitarian aid, I have argued that both 
these views are incorrect. While the possession of cognitive and emotional 
empathy is clearly not sufficient for being moral, the requirement for cog-
nitive empathy arises out of a proper understanding of moral functioning, 
and the need for emotional empathy arises out of a natural necessity due to 
the kind of affiliative, biological creatures that we are. Since our capacities 
for cognitive and emotional empathy are not simply innately given but capa-
ble of being shaped by processes of learning and culture, statist arguments 
against stronger moral obligations across nations are poorly founded. Sup-
port for statism, if there is such, must come from elsewhere.
What this might imply for variations of cosmopolitanism would need 
further development. One can hold cosmopolitan principles while endors-
ing the current global system of states and institutions, but cosmopolitans 
such as Brock argue for the need for stronger global governance structures, 
and some even for global government. While it is possible that a better 
understanding of empathy could play a role in assessing the desirability of 
these alternatives, it is likely that other factors, including historical/prag-
matic ones, will play a more important role. A further question is whether 
11 For instance, Nussbaum analyzes the use by the Roosevelt administration of photogra-
phy and specific photographic techniques to create positive emotions of empathy and 
sympathy. While the ends may have been laudible, such methods by themselves do not 
create MMARs and can instead serve as tools of political manipulation.
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empathy can be linked more specifically to forms of government. Nuss-
baum’s treatment of empathy and the treatment here suggest that a properly 
developed capacity for empathy is at least a civic virtue. But the civic virtue 
of empathy can exist in both democratic and non-democratic polities. Does 
properly developed empathy move one towards sympathetic identification 
with democratic rather than nondemocratic forms of government and gov-
ernance? Plausibly it does, since to respect others as others is to desire the 
flourishing of others and not just oneself, and this would include a desire to 
see others fulfill their own political expression. The consideration of empa-
thy as a virtue, indeed a democratic virtue, to be nurtured and cultivated, is 
thus worthy of further exploration.
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